Privacy and what we cannot see
Privacy and what we cannot see
Orange Way is built so that we cannot read your data, by the architecture. Not by promise. This walks through exactly
what's protected, exactly what's not, and what assumptions you have to accept to use the app.
The one-sentence version
Your transactions, balances, categories, household members, and goals are all encrypted in your browser before they ever
reach our server. We hold ciphertext only. A breach of our database leaks scrambled bytes, not your financial life.
What we cannot see
- Transaction amounts. Stored as encrypted_payload per record.
- Counterparty names. "Whole Foods", "Alice", whatever you typed — encrypted.
- Memos and descriptions. Same.
- Categories. Your "Coffee" bucket and your "Bitcoin DCA" bucket — encrypted.
- Wallet addresses. Even on the Orange Rails side, xpub-derived addresses never leave your browser thanks to Stealth
Sync.
- Goal amounts. The $400 grocery budget — encrypted.
- Household member identities beyond their account email. The link from "this account belongs to this household" is in
the database; who you call them and how they relate to you (spouse, kid, accountant) is not.
What we can see
- Account metadata — email, signup time, last-active timestamp. Needed for billing + login.
- Connection types — that you have an xpub connection and a Coinbase connection, for example. We need this to route
your syncs. The credentials themselves are encrypted.
- Sync timing — when your last sync ran, whether it succeeded. Needed for ops + customer support.
- Aggregate counts — total number of transactions, number of categories — but not their contents.
- Anything you tell support — if you open a support ticket and paste a screenshot, we see what's in the screenshot.
Same as any other support channel.
How the encryption works (plain English)
1. When you sign up, you pick a vault password. The app derives an encryption key from it using Argon2id (memory-hard,
takes about a second on a modern device).
2. Every time you write something to Orange Way — a transaction, a category, a goal — the app scrambles it with that
key in the browser before sending it.
3. The server receives opaque bytes. It stores them.
4. When you sign in, you re-enter the vault password, the app re-derives the key, and unlocks everything in memory.
5. The key never leaves your device. We don't have it. We can't recover it.
Household sharing (how partners see the same data)
When you invite a partner, the app does a one-time key exchange:
1. They sign up and get their own vault password (different from yours).
2. You both meet a six-digit code on screen to confirm no one is in the middle (a man-in-the-middle attacker would see
different codes on each device).
3. The household master key (which actually encrypts the shared data) gets re-wrapped for them, using their key.
4. From that point on, both of you can decrypt the household data with your own vault password.
If a partner loses their password, you can re-share with them as long as one of you still has access. If you both lose
access, you need the Shamir recovery share (the PDF/QR you saved at vault setup) to recover.
What we cannot protect against
- A compromised device. If malware reads your keyboard, it sees your vault password. Endpoint security is on you.
- A phished password. Same. We can't tell the difference between you and someone holding a gun to your head.
- An upstream wallet/exchange breach. Coinbase getting hacked doesn't leak Orange Way's data — but it does leak
whatever Coinbase already had on you. We can't help with that.
- A subpoena. We will comply with valid legal orders, but we can only hand over what we have: ciphertext, metadata,
billing info. We cannot decrypt your data for law enforcement because we don't have your key.
Auditor and accountant access
You can give an auditor (CPA, family lawyer, etc.) read-only access to a defined slice of your household data. They get
their own Orange Way account, the household key gets wrapped for them, and they can see whatever you scope to them — but
they can't write, edit, or share with anyone else. Audit log records every read.
This is the Phase 4.4 Auditor flow. Detailed setup: Bring in an auditor or accountant.
What to do if you lose your vault password
1. Find your Shamir recovery share (the PDF/QR Orange Way generated at vault setup — you should have stored it
offline).
2. Sign in with email confirmation, then use the recovery flow with your share + one of the two backup shares (your
household partner, or Orange Way's emergency recovery share if you opted in to that at signup).
3. Set a new vault password. The household master key gets re-wrapped under the new password.
If you don't have a recovery share and no household partner with access, your data is unrecoverable. Same as a hardware
wallet seed — that's the trade-off for true zero-knowledge.
Independent verification
- Cryptographic audit — planned. Trail of Bits or NCC Group when Orange Way hits 1.0.
- SOC 2 — planned post-1.0 for the hosted service.
- Source code — Apache 2.0 at github.com/MorningRevolution/orange-way. Audit it yourself or hire someone to.
You don't have to trust this page. You can verify everything in the source.